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Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen

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  • Rosenkranz, Stephanie
  • Schmitz, Patrick W.

Abstract

We discuss the literature on vertical relationships between firms from a contract-theoretic perspective.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6930/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6930.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6930

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  30. Patrick de Graba, 1996. "Most-Favored-Customer Clauses and Multilateral Contracting: When Nondiscrimination Implies Uniformity," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(4), pages 565-579, December.
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  54. Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, 1998. "The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 57-84, April.
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  57. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Management Incentives, Signaling Effects and the Costs of Vertical Integration," IZA Discussion Papers 856, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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