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Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design

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  • Jenny Kragl

    ()
    (Department of Governance &Economics, EBS University für Wirtschaft und Recht Wiesbaden, Germany)

  • Anja Schöttner

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany)

Abstract

We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however, induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under specialization. We further show that variations in the wage floor and the agents' reservation utility have significantly different effects on welfare and optimal job design.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Konstanz in its series Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz with number 2012-36.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 14 Dec 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:knz:dpteco:1236

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Related research

Keywords: Job Design; Limited Liability; Minimum Wage; Moral Hazard; Multitasking; Performance Measurement;

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