Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0403.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
INFORMATION; HUMAN RESOURCES; MANPOWER; MANPOWER; MORAL HAZARD;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
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- Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "On Delegation under Relational Contracts," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse32_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "On Delegation under Relational Contracts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 113, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 1994. "La mise en vigueur des politiques environnementales et l’organisation de la firme," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(2), pages 211-224, juin.
- Anja Schöttner, 2005. "Relational Contracts and Job Design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-052, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2009. "Task assignment, incentives and technological factors," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 43-55.
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