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Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design

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  • Meyer, M.A.
  • Olsen, T.E.
  • Torsvik, G.

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 102.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:102

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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

Related research

Keywords: LABOUR MARKET; ECONOMIC MODELS;

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References

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  1. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1991. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1995. "Intertemporal common agency and organizational design: How much decentralization?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1405-1428, August.
  3. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
  4. Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July.
  5. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
  6. Macleod, W.B. & Kenemoto, Y., 1990. "The Ratchet Effect and the Market for Second-Hand Workers," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 9027, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  7. Meyer, Margaret A & Vickers, John, 1995. "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1107, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-36, May.
  9. Itoh Hideshi, 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 410-427, August.
  10. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Itoh, Hideshi, 1992. "Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 321-45, April.
  12. Meyer, Margaret A., 1995. "Cooperation and competition in organizations: A dynamic perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 709-722, April.
  13. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kaarbøe, Oddvar M. & Olsen, Trond E., 2004. "Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives," Discussion Papers, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics 2004/21, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  2. Anja Schöttner, 2005. "Relational Contracts and Job Design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-052, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  3. Indjejikian, Raffi & Nanda, Dhananjay, 2003. "Reply to: dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting: a comment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 437-441, August.
  4. George J. Mailath & Volker Nocke & Andrew Postlewaite, 2004. "Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 617-633, December.
  5. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.
  6. Pablo Casas-Arce & Santhi Hejeebu, 2004. "Job Design and the Benefits of Private Trade," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 204, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  7. Feltham, Gerald & Indjejikian, Raffi & Nanda, Dhananjay, 2006. "Dynamic incentives and dual-purpose accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 417-437, December.
  8. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Bardsley, Peter, 2001. "Multi-task agency: a combinatorial model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 233-248, February.
  10. Indjejikian, Raffi & Nanda, Dhananjay, 1999. "Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 177-201, April.
  11. Fumi Kiyotaki, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments with Multiple Tasks," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics 0804, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  12. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2003. "Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting: a comment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 423-436, August.

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