On the Release of Players to National Teams
AbstractThe release of players from a club to the national team often leads to a conflict concerning the duration of the players' stay with the national team. Based on a theoretical bargaining model, we examine whether intervention in this conflict by a governing body is desirable. We show that bargaining between the club and the national team yields a socially inefficient outcome if financial compensation is either prohibited or limited. If, however, the national team is allowed to pay unlimited financial compensation to the club, it is not necessary to intervene in the negotiations because the bargaining outcome will be socially optimal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA) in its series Working Papers with number 0045.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
National team; release of players; compensation payment; bargaining; team sports;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
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