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A Strategic Rationale for the Use of Sell–On Fees in European Sports

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  • Oliver Gürtler

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany)

Abstract

In European team sports, contracts that govern the transfer of a player from one club to another often contain a clause specifying a sell-on fee. Such clause ensures that the selling club profits from a future transfer of the player. This article gives possible explanations for the use of sell-on fees. Besides rather obvious explanations based on risk considerations and wealth constraints, the article shows that a sell-on fee could be used for strategic reasons. In particular, the clubs may agree on a sell-on fee since it affects the behavior of the buying club in future transfer negotiations in a favorable way.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by in its journal Journal of Sports Economics.

Volume (Year): 13 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 76-84

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Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:13:y:2012:i:1:p:76-84

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Related research

Keywords: sell-on fee; sports; negotiation; transfer;

References

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  1. Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2002. "Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football," IZA Discussion Papers 423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 105(1), pages 139-154, 03.
  4. Hongbin Cai & Walter Cont, 2004. "Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 703-729, December.
  5. John Fingleton, 2005. "Career Concerns of Bargainers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 179-204, April.
  6. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
  8. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, October.
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