This paper shows that under reasonable conditions that increasing gate revenue sharing among teams in a sports league will produce a more uneven contest, i.e. reduce competitive balance. This result has significant implications for antitrust authorities and legislators, who have tended to assume that revenue sharing arrangements will necessarily promote competitive balance.
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Paper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number
2003003.
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Matthias Kräkel, 2005.
"Doping in Contest-Like Situations,"
Discussion Papers
46, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
William Chan & Pascal Courty & Hao Li, 2006.
"Suspense,"
Working Papers
tecipa-223, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Chan, William M & Courty, Pascal & Li, Hao, 2002.
"Suspense,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)