First and Second Prizes in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests
AbstractMost of the contest literature deals with first prizes; this Paper deals with the optimality of second prizes. We show that in a three-person contest where one contestant is very strong a second prize can be optimal from the point of view of eliciting maximum effort from every contestant. Moreover, we consider the desirability of second prizes from the point of view of competitive balance, which matters for contests such as sports competitions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4484.
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Frode Meland & Odd Straume, 2007.
"Outsourcing in contests,"
Public Choice, Springer,
Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 315-331, June.
- Guido Ascari & Philippe Gagnepain, 2007. "Evaluating Rent Dissipation in the Spanish Football Industry," Post-Print hal-00622841, HAL.
- Sela, Aner, 2009. "Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2008. "Allocation of prizes in asymmetric all-pay auctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 123-132, March.
- Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
- Cohen, Chen & Sela, Aner, 2005. "Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4951, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.