Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in an Agency Problem: An example from the National Football League

Contents:

Author Info

  • Scott E. Atkinson
  • Linda R. Stanley
  • John Tschirhart
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We consider a professional sports league's use of a well-defined incentive mechanism, revenue sharing, to encourage the desired behavior of teams in the league. The incentive mechanism works by internalizing externalities that arise across agents (the team owners). We find revenue sharing to be a potentially powerful incentive scheme because in this setting it encourages an optimal distribution of resources among agents. Its effectiveness is mitigated, however, by agents who enjoy private, nonmonetary benefits that are not shared. Using data from the National Football League, we examine how well the propositions explain observed behavior in this relationship.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28198821%2919%3A1%3C27%3ARSAAII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 19 (1988)
    Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
    Pages: 27-43

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:spring:p:27-43

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.rje.org

    Order Information:
    Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Helmut Dietl & Markus Lang & Stephan Werner, 2008. "Social Welfare in Sports Leagues with Profit-Maximizing and/or Win-Maximizing Clubs," Working Papers 0826, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists.
    2. Thomas Peeters, 2011. "Optimal gate revenue sharing in sports leagues," Working Papers 1122, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists.
    3. Biner, Burhan, 2009. "Equal Strength or Dominant Teams: Policy Analysis of NFL," MPRA Paper 17920, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. José M. Sánchez Santos & Pablo Castellanos García & Jesus A. Dopico Castro, 2006. "The production process in basketball: Empirical evidence from Spanish league," IASE Conference Papers 0628, International Association of Sports Economists.
    5. Pelnar, Gregory, 2007. "Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues," MPRA Paper 5382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Nyberg, Sten & Priks, Mikael, 2014. "Public Order and Private Payments: Paying for Police Services at Events," Research Papers in Economics 2014:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    7. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:spring:p:27-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.