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Sport as Business

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  • Andrew Zimbalist
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    Abstract

    There is both a popular and academic literature suggesting that owners of sports teams do not profit maximize. The alternative formulation entails either win or utility maximization, usually subject to a breakeven constraint. Another line of economic analysis holds that team owners do fundamentally profit maximize or that profit maximization provides a useful benchmark against which to assess actual performance. There has been some empirical work attempting to decipher the true objective function of team owners. These results are inconclusive. Objective functions, however, remain important because they affect both owner behaviour and league performance. In practice, owners' objectives vary by team, league, and country and are strongly affected by how the team relates to an owner's other assets. The next task for modelling the behaviour and performance of sports leagues is to take fuller account of the diversity of ownership objectives within a given league. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.

    Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
    Pages: 503-511

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:19:y:2003:i:4:p:503-511

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    Web page: http://oxrep.oupjournals.org/

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    Cited by:
    1. Helmut Dietl & Tobias Duschl & Markus Lang, 2010. "Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues," Working Papers 0038, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA), revised Oct 2010.
    2. Smith, Aaron C.T. & Stewart, Bob, 2010. "The special features of sport: A critical revisit," Sport Management Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-13, February.
    3. Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang & Philipp Theiler, 2010. "The Sugar Daddy's Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports," Working Papers 0037, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA), revised Oct 2010.
    4. Jardin, Mathieu, 2009. "Efficiency of French football clubs and its dynamics," MPRA Paper 19828, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Raul Caruso, 2008. "Il calcio tra mercato, relazioni e coercizione," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 4(1), pages 71-88, Aprile.
    6. Nyberg, Sten & Priks, Mikael, 2014. "Public Order and Private Payments: Paying for Police Services at Events," Research Papers in Economics 2014:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    7. Mario Nicoliello, 2008. "Reddito e capitale nelle società di calcio: la massima serie italiana 1998-2007," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 4(2), pages 67-94, Agosto.
    8. Caruso, Raul, 2011. "Crime and sport participation: Evidence from Italian regions over the period 1997–2003," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 455-463.

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