Club objectives and ticket pricing in professional team sports
AbstractIn this paper the simultaneous decision of a professional sports club on gate ticket prices and talent demand is analysed for a profit and a win maximizing sports club. Although the pricing rule is the same in both scenario’s, the ticket price and the talent demand turn out to be higher in a win maximizing club. Somewhat unexpected is the result that an increase of salary level lowers the optimal ticket price, which complicates the impact of a salary cap on the ticket price. One of the consequences of the identical pricing rule is that all tests based on the pricing rule cannot be conclusive w.r.t. the objective of a club. Also the value of the estimated price elasticity of the demand for tickets can hardly reveal anything about the objective of a sports club. More reliable tests could be based on the comparison of the marginal productivity and the salary level, or on the different impact of revenue sharing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2002018.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2002
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Web page: https://www.uantwerp.be/en/faculties/applied-economic-sciences/
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Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Kesenne & Wilfried Pauwels, 2006. "Club Objectives and Ticket Pricing in Professional Team Sports," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 549-560, Summer.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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