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The Economic Consequences of Foreigner Rules in National Sports Leagues

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Author Info

  • Markus Lang

    ()
    (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Alexander Rathke

    ()
    (Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Marco Runkel

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Magdeburg)

Abstract

This paper provides a contest model of a professional team sports league and analyzes the impact of a restriction on foreign players. It shows that a league with binding restrictions on foreign talent for all clubs is more balanced than a league without binding restrictions on foreign talent. Moreover, the wage level of domestic (foreign) talent is higher (lower) in a league with a binding restriction on foreign players. Finally, a tighter restriction on foreign players increases profits of all clubs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists in its series Working Papers with number 0908.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:spe:wpaper:0908

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Related research

Keywords: Team Sports Leagues; UEFA's Homegrown Rule; FIFA's 6+5 Rule; Competitive Balance; Player Salaries;

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References

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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. 6+5: the economics
    by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2009-05-05 13:57:45
  2. Limiting Foreigners in Sports Leagues
    by jamesreade in International Journal of Sport Finance Blog on 2009-08-20 17:35:45
  3. Limit foreigners in sports leagues
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-08-17 14:49:00
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Cited by:
  1. Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke, 2011. "Organizational Differences between U.S. Major Leagues and European Leagues: Implications for Salary Caps," Working Papers 1105, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists.

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