Martin Grossmann () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich) Helmut Dietl () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)
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This paper presents a two-period model of talent investments where two clubs compete with respect to a contest prize. We show that two qualitatively different types of equilibria are possible using a closed-loop approach with strictly convex costs: The large market club invests in both periods more than the small market club or the small market club invests in both periods more than the large market club. In case of an open-loop approach with strictly convex costs, however, the large market club always invests more. The open-loop and closed-loop equilibria coincide if costs are linear.
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Paper provided by University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) in its series Working Papers with number
0069.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Reinganum, Jennifer F., .
"Dynamic Games of Innovation,"
Working Papers
287, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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