This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Michael R. Baye (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business)
Dan Kovenock (Purdue University)
Casper G. de Vries (Tilbergen Institute and Erasmus University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skillful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bus.indiana.edu/riharbau/RePEc/iuk/wpaper/bepp2004-24-baye-kovenock-devries.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy in its series Working Papers with number 2004-24.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economic Journal, 2005
Handle: RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2004-24

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1309 East Tenth Street, Room 451, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701
Phone: 812-855-9219
Fax: 812-855-3354
Email:
Web page: http://www.bus.indiana.edu/bepp/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Rick Harbaugh).

Related research
Keywords: auctions contests litigation fee-shifting

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Chang, Howard F, 1996. "An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 371-403, June.
    Other versions:
  2. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1998. "Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 519-35, June.
    Other versions:
  3. Kathryn E. Spier, 1994. "Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 197-214, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Applying Auction Theory to Economics," Economics Series Working Papers 001, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Spier, Kathryn E, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Schweizer, Urs, 1989. "Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2), pages 163-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Waldfogel, Joel, 1998. "Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 451-76, October.
    Other versions:
  8. Posner, Richard A, 1997. "Explaining the Variance in the Number of Tort Suits across U.S. States and between the United States and England," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 477-89, June.
  9. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1996. "Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 269-280, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Hughes, James W & Snyder, Edward A, 1995. "Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 225-50, April.
  12. Steven A. Matthews, 1995. "A Technical Primer on Auction Theory I: Independent Private Values," Discussion Papers 1096, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  13. Snyder, Edward A & Hughes, James W, 1990. "The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 345-80, Fall.
  14. Hause, John C, 1989. "Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 157-79, January.
  15. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Konrad, Kai A & Kovenock, Dan, 2005. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War," CEPR Discussion Papers 5205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2006. "The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information," Discussion Papers in Economics 06_01, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Mehari Mekonnen Akalu, 2002. "Measuring and Ranking Value Drivers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-043/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-071/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2005. "Contests with multi-tasking," Discussion Papers 125, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, revised May 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also computes impact factors for journals and working paper series.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.