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Political Institutions and Incentives for Economic Reforms

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  • Börner, Kira Astrid
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    Abstract

    Political institutions matter for the incentives of politicians to implement economic reforms. This dissertation presents tools of analysis for understanding how political institutions constrain and shape the incentives of political decision-makers. Thus, it identifies reasons for why current governments might not enact sufficiently large economic reforms, delay necessary reforms, or take the wrong reform steps, as they are commonly perceived to do. In particular, the dissertation analyzes the incentives to privatize state-owned enterprises, to enact reforms in the presence of influential interest gropus, and to implement anti-corruption measures.

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    File URL: http://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3165/1/Boerner_Kira_Astrid.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Dissertations in Economics with number 3165.

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    Date of creation: 26 Jan 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:lmu:dissen:3165

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    Related research

    Keywords: political economy; political institutions; privatization; interest groups; corruption;

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, 1993. "Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe," Munich Reprints in Economics 3400, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A, 2004. "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 4458, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," NBER Working Papers 8460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Atif Mian, 2008. "Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 273-306, October.
    6. repec:bla:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:1:p:269-286 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2000. "The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation," Munich Reprints in Economics 19771, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    8. George T. Abed & Hamid Reza Davoodi, 2000. "Corruption, Structural Reforms, and Economic Performance in the Transition Economies," IMF Working Papers 00/132, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
    10. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    11. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 2002. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 3261, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, April.
    13. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February.
    15. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    16. Yarrow, George, 1999. "A theory of privatization, or why bureaucrats are still in business," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 157-168, January.
    17. Young, Oran R., 1991. "Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(03), pages 281-308, June.
    18. Mary M. Shirley, 1997. "POLICY ARENA: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(6), pages 849-864.
    19. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-87, November.
    20. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1996. "The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach," Munich Reprints in Economics 19773, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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