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Incentive Issues In R&D Consortia: Insights From Applied Game Theory

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  • ERAN BINENBAUM
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    Abstract

    "This article sketches how insights from applied game theory can be applied to Research and Development (R&D) consortia using a case study on an international plant breeding consortium. The insights jointly comprise a new "logic of collective action in R&D," which is inspired by Olson's Logic of Collective Action but goes beyond it. We analyze R&D consortia as institutions that respond to a variety of incentive problems which are obstacles to realizing the benefits of cooperation that arise due to the public goods nature of outputs, complementarities of inputs, and economies of scale and scope. Additionally, we sketch a "big-picture" consortium game, which abstracts from specific incentive issues. "("JEL "B41, D02, H41, O31, O32) Copyright (c) 2008 Western Economic Association International.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Contemporary Economic Policy.

    Volume (Year): 26 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 636-650

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:26:y:2008:i:4:p:636-650

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    1. Borm, P.E.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Rafels, C. & Suijs, J.P.M. & Tijs, S.H. & Timmer, J.B., 1999. "Cooperation in Capital Deposits," Discussion Paper 1999-31, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," Microeconomics 9612002, EconWPA.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April.
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