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Collective Action in Plant Breeding

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  • Binenbaum, Eran
  • Pardey, Philip G.

Abstract

Olson (1965) formulated a "Logic of Collective Action". We investigate whether a logic of collective action in plant breeding - and research and development generally - can be constructed. Using a case study on the Latin American Fund for Irrigated Rice (FLAR) as well as other real-world institutions of collective action in R&D, we construct an expanded logic of collective action, which revolves around two core features: Impure public goods and the tragedy of the anticommons. Provisions of FLAR and other institutions are related to game theory and contract theory, and theoretical, methodological and policy implications are outlined.

Suggested Citation

  • Binenbaum, Eran & Pardey, Philip G., 2005. "Collective Action in Plant Breeding," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19530, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea05:19530
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19530
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pardey, Philip G. & Beintema, Nienke M. & Dehmer, Steven & Wood, Stanley, 2006. "Agricultural research: a growing global divide?," Food policy reports 17, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

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