R&D collaboration with uncertain intellectual property rights
AbstractPatent pendencies create uncertainty in research and development (R&D) collaboration agreements, resulting in a threat of expropriation of unprotected knowledge by potential partners, reduced bargaining power and enhanced search costs. In this paper, we show that - depending of the type of partner - uncertain intellectual property rights (IPR) lead to reduced collaboration between firms and may hinder the production of knowledge. This has implications for technology policy as R&D collaborations are exempt from anti-trust legislation in order to increase R&D in the economy. We argue that a functional IPR system is needed for successful utilization of this policy. --
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 11-010.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
R&D collaboration; intellectual property; uncertainty; patents;
Other versions of this item:
- Czarnitzki, Dirk & Hussinger, Katrin & Schneider, Cédric, 2011. "R&D collaboration with uncertain intellectual property rights," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/296279, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-03-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2011-03-26 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-IND-2011-03-26 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2011-03-26 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2011-03-26 (Intellectual Property Rights)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hussinger, Katrin & Wastyn, Annelies, 2011. "In search for the not-invented-here syndrome: The role of knowledge sources and firm success," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-048, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.