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Are More Important Patents Approved More Slowly and Should They Be?

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Author Info
Régibeau, Pierre
Rockett, Katharine

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Abstract

Innovative activities often are heavily regulated. Reviews conducted by administrative agencies take time and are not perfectly accurate. Of particular concern is whether, by design or not, such agencies discriminate against more important innovations by taking more time to perform their reviews. We study the relationship between the length of patent review and the importance of inventions in a theoretical model. We build a simple model of the US patent review process. The model predicts that, controlling for a patent's position in the new technology cycle, more important innovations would (and should) be approved more quickly. Also, the approval delay is likely to decrease as an industry moves from the early stages of an innovation cycle to later stages. These predictions are in line with the evidence we obtain from a data set of US patents granted in the field of genetically modified crops from 1983 to 1999. Our analysis also helps to reconcile the results on the relationship between importance and delay found in previous studies.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6178.

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Date of creation: Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6178

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Related research
Keywords: genetic modification; innovation; patent policy; regulation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights
O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Government Policy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ricardo J. Caballero & Adam B. Jaffe, 1993. "How High are the Giants' Shoulders: An Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in a Model of Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 4370, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Harhoff, Dietmar & Wagner, Stefan, 2005. "Modelling the duration of patent examination at the European Patent Office," CEPR Discussion Papers 5283, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 1999. "The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators," NBER Working Papers 7345, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Iain M. Cockburn & Samuel Kortum & Scott Stern, 2002. "Are All Patent Examiners Equal? The Impact of Examiner Characteristics," NBER Working Papers 8980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Manuel Trajtenberg, 1990. "A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 172-187, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 1996. "Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 60-83, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. David Dranove & David Meltzer, 1994. "Do Important Drugs Reach the Market Sooner?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 402-423, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Johnson, Daniel K N & Popp, David, 2003. " Forced Out of the Closet: The Impact of the American Inventors Protection Act on the Timing of Patent Disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 96-112, Spring.
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  9. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, 2004. "Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 441-465, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dietmar Harhoff & Stefan Wagner, 2006. "Modeling the Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent Office," Discussion Papers 170, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Florian Schuett, 2009. "Inventors and Impostors: An Economic Analysis of Patent Examination," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/28, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. M. Conti & P. Regibeau & K. Rockett, 2003. "How Basic is (Patented) University Research? The Case of GM Crops," Economics Discussion Papers 558, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2009. "From patent renewals to applications survival: do portfolio management strategies play a role in patent length?," Working Papers CEB 09-028.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  5. Schneider, Cédric, 2007. "The Outcome of Patent Applications - Does Experience Matter?," MPRA Paper 3359, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 2005. "Competition, Regulation, and Intellectual Property Management in Genetically Modified Foods: Evidence from Survey Data," Economics Discussion Papers 591, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2009. "Filing strategies and the increasing duration of patent applications," Working Papers CEB 09-005.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
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