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Filing strategies and the increasing duration of patent applications

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Author Info
Nicolas van Zeebroeck () (Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels.)

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Abstract

It has long been implicitly assumed that the roaring backlogs experienced by most patent offices around the world – and harshly criticized by many patentees – are a mere mechanical consequence of surging numbers of patent filings. However, different voices suggest that the patent system may sometimes be gamed by an applicant in order precisely to delay the time when a decision will be taken as to the patentability of his application. By empirically showing the impact of several procedural options chosen by patentees in filing their applications at the EPO, this paper clearly demonstrates that this possibility is real, and probably not anecdotal. Deliberate or not, the main consequence of several procedural options is clearly to delay the grant decision. Why and how firms could win any benefit from such strategies can only be guessed, but whether such behaviours are legitimate or not, socially desirable or not, remains an open question.

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File URL: http://www.solvay.edu/EN/Research/Bernheim/documents/wp09005.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB) in its series Working Papers CEB with number 09-005.RS.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:09-005

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Related research
Keywords: Patent length; Patent value; Renewals; Backlogs; Survival Time Analysis;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights
O50 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Harhoff, Dietmar & Wagner, Stefan, 2005. "Modelling the duration of patent examination at the European Patent Office," CEPR Discussion Papers 5283, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2007. "Patents only live twice: a patent survival analysis in Europe," Working Papers CEB 07-028.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  3. P. Regibeau & K. Rockett, 2003. "Are More Important Patents Approved More Slowly and Should They Be?," Economics Discussion Papers 556, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2008. "Long live patents: the increasing life expectancy of patent applications and its determinants," Working Papers CEB 08-040.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  5. Deepak Hegde & David C. Mowery & Stuart Graham, 2007. "Pioneers, Submariners, or Thicket-builders: Which Firms Use Continuations in Patenting?," NBER Working Papers 13153, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. David Popp & Ted Juhl & Daniel K.N. Johnson, 2003. "Time in Purgatory: Determinants of the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications," NBER Working Papers 9518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Per Maurseth, 2005. "Lovely but dangerous: The impact of patent citations on patent renewal," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(5), pages 351-374, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kortum, Samuel & Lerner, Josh, 1999. "What is behind the recent surge in patenting?1," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.


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