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The Role of Patents for Bridging the Science to Market Gap

In: Academic Science and Entrepreneurship: Dual Engines of Growth

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  • Thomas Hellmann

Abstract

This paper examines an ex-post rationale for the patenting of scientific discoveries. In this model, scientist do not know which firms can make use of their discoveries, and firms do not know which scientific discoveries might be useful to them. To bridge this gap, either or both sides need to engage in costly search activities. Patents determine the appropriability of scientific discoveries, which affects the scientists. and firms. willingness to engage in search. Patents decrease dissemination when the search intensity of firms is sufficiently elastic, relative to that of scientists. The model also examines the role of universities. Patents facilitate the delegation of search activities to the universities%u2019 technology transfer offices, which enables efficient specialization. Rather than distracting scientists from doing research, patenting may be a complement to doing research.

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This chapter was published in:

  • Adam Jaffe & Josh Lerner & Scott Stern & Marie Thursby, 2007. "Academic Science and Entrepreneurship: Dual Engines of Growth," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number jaff05-2, July.
    This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 5350.

    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:5350

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