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Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Roider, Andreas
Schmitz, Patrick W.
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registered author(s):
The experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second-price auctions, regardless of bidders' valuations. In contrast, in first-price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations, but underbidding for small valuations. We show that the experimental evidence can be explained by a simple extension of the standard auction model, where bidders anticipate positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing. Even if the "emotional" (dis-)utility is very small, the seller's optimal reserve price r* may be significantly different from the standard model. Moreover, r* is decreasing in the number of bidders.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
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Date of creation: Sep 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6476Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801 Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
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Keywords: auction theory ; emotions ; reserve prices ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
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