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Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment

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Author Info
Andreoni, James
Che, Yeon-Koo
Kim, Jinwoo

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 59 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 240-259
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:2:p:240-259

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. David J. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2006. "Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1557, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. John Morgan & Ken Steiglitz & George Reis, 2003. "The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1102-1102. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 247-272, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Douglas Dyer & John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1989. "Resolving Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders in Independent Private-Value Auctions: An Experimental Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 268-279, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kim, Jinwoo & Che, Yeon-Koo, 2004. "Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 383-397, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm387, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Chen, Kay-Yut & Plott, Charles R., 1998. "Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 34-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Blume, Andreas, 2003. "Bertrand without fudge," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 167-168, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Selten, Reinhard, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Klaus Abbink, 1995. "Money does Not Induce Risk Neutral Behavior, but Binary Lotteries Do even Worse," Discussion Paper Serie B 343, University of Bonn, Germany.
  11. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1988. " Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 61-99, March.
  12. Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior In First, Second And Third-Price Auctions With Varying Numbers Of Bidders," Papers 13, Houston - Department of Economics.
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  13. Thomas Palfrey, 2002. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000089, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David J. Cooper & Hanming Fang, 2006. "Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1557, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price," Microeconomics 0508008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 6476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 121473000000000021, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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