This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Neugebauer, Tibor
Selten, Reinhard
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
No abstract is available for
this item.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 54 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 183-204
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:183-204Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).
Keywords: Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Christina Bannier, 2007.
"Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences? ,"
Financial Markets and Portfolio Management ,
Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 445-470, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiss, J. Philipp & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2008.
"A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions ,"
Research Memoranda
050, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Wilfred Amaldoss & Teck-Hua Ho & Aradhna Krishna & Kay-Yut Chen & Preyas Desai & Ganesh Iyer & Sanjay Jain & Noah Lim & John Morgan & Ryan Oprea & Joydeep Srivasatava, 2008.
"Experiments on strategic choices and markets ,"
Marketing Letters ,
Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 417-429, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007.
"Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations ,"
Department Discussion Papers
0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
[Downloadable!]
Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2006.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Vincent Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
2005-13, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
[Downloadable!] Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Vincent P Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000001005, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007.
"Multiagent System Simulations of Signal Averaging in English Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals ,"
Department Discussion Papers
0708, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
[Downloadable!]
Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007.
"Multiagent System Simulations of Sealed-Bid Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals ,"
Department Discussion Papers
0707, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities .
This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .