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Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment

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  • Dufwenberg, Martin
  • Gneezy, Uri

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  • Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2002. "Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 431-444, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:48:y:2002:i:4:p:431-444
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1984. "The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(4), pages 479-507, October.
    2. F. T. Dolbear & L. B. Lave & G. Bowman & A. Lieberman & E. Prescott & F. Rueter & R. Sherman, 1968. "Collusion in Oligopoly: An Experiment on the Effect of Numbers and Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 82(2), pages 240-259.
    3. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    4. Piccione, Michele & Tan, Guofu, 1996. "Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(3), pages 663-685, August.
    5. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
    6. Luton, Richard & McAfee, R. Preston, 1986. "Sequential procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 181-195, November.
    7. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 102-134, October.
    8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 7-22, January.
    9. Hoggatt, Austin C & Friedman, James W & Gill, Shlomo, 1976. "Price Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 261-266, May.
    10. Rapoport, Amnon & Amaldoss, Wilfred, 2000. "Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 483-521, August.
    11. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
    12. Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 1997. "Information And Cost Asymmetry In Experimental Duopoly Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(2), pages 290-299, May.
    13. Dana, James Jr. & Spier, Kathryn E., 1994. "Designing a private industry : Government auctions with endogenous market structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 127-147, January.
    14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-937, October.
    15. Plott, Charles R., 1989. "An updated review of industrial organization: Applications of experimental methods," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1109-1176, Elsevier.
    16. McGuire, Thomas G. & Riordan, Michael H., 1995. "Incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 125-141, January.
    17. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    18. Cason, Timothy N., 1995. "Cheap talk price signaling in laboratory markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 183-204, June.
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