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Bidding ‘as if’ risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback

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Author Info
Tibor Neugebauer ()
Javier Perote

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-007-9166-0
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 190-202
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:11:y:2008:i:2:p:190-202

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Experimental economics; First-price sealed-bid auctions; Independent private value model; Bidding theory; Risk aversion; Learning; C12; C13; C72; C92; D44;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Reinhard Selten & Klaus Abbink & Ricarda Cox, 2005. "Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 5-20, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Elena Katok, 2007. "Regret in auctions: theory and evidence," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 81-101, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Olivier Armantier & Nicolas Treich, 2006. "Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-15, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dyer, Douglas & Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1989. "A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 108-15, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M., 1985. "Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 139-159, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Robert Dorsey & Laura Razzolini, 2003. "Explaining Overbidding in First Price Auctions Using Controlled Lotteries," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 123-140, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Friedman, Daniel, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1374-78, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Tibor Neugebauer, 2005. "Bidding Strategies Of Sequential First Price Auctions Programmed By Experienced Bidders," Experimental 0503007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Walker, James M. & Smith, Vernon L. & Cox, James C., 1987. "Bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions : Use of computerized Nash competitors," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 239-244. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kagel, John H & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1379-91, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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