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Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities

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Author Info
Olivier Armantier ()
Nicolas Treich

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Abstract

We conduct an experiment to test whether probability misperception may be a possible alternative to risk aversion to explain overbidding in independent first-price private-values auctions. The experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction, and indeed overbid. Yet, when provided with feed-back on the precision of their predictions, subjects learn first to predict their probability of winning correctly, and second to curb-down significantly overbidding. The structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that i) subjects are heterogenous with respect to risk preferences and probability perceptions, ii) subjects tend to best-respond to their stated beliefs, and iii) although necessary to explain fully behavior, risk aversion appears to play a lesser role than previously believed. Finally, our experimental findings are shown to be consistent with a standard theoretical auction model combining risk aversion and misperception of probabilities.

Nous menons une expérience pour évaluer si le fait qu'un sujet évalue mal ses probabilités de gagner peut être une hypothèse alternative à l’aversion au risque pour expliquer les surenchères lors d'enchères indépendantes privées au premier prix. Les résultats expérimentaux montrent, en effet, que les sujets sous-estiment leurs probabilités de gagner l'enchère et ont tendance à surenchérir. Cependant, lorsqu'on leur présente plus de précisions sur leurs prédictions, les sujets apprennent d'abord à prédire correctement leurs probabilités de gagner, puis à limiter considérablement la surenchère. L'estimation de différents modèles du comportement suggère que i) les sujets sont hétérogènes par rapport à leurs préférences du risque et leurs perceptions des probabilités, ii) les sujets choisissent leur meilleure réponse conditionnellement aux croyances qu’ils révèlent, et iii) bien que nécessaire pour expliquer pleinement le comportement des sujets, l'aversion au risque semble jouer un rôle moins important que prévu. Finalement, nos résultats expérimentaux sont consistants avec un modèle théorique d'enchères standard qui combine l'aversion au risque et la mauvaise perception des probabilités.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2006s-15.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-15

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Related research
Keywords: auctions; misperception of probabilities; overbidding; risk-aversion; aversion au risque; enchères; mauvaise perception des probabilités; surenchère;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Estimates of Own Lethal Risks and Anchoring Effects," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-14, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2008. "Bidding ‘as if’ risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 190-202, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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