Experimental Development of Sealed-Bid Auction Theory: Calibrating Controls for Risk Aversion
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 75 (1985)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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