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• James Marvin Walker
• Vernon L. Smith

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Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 39 (1984)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 983-1010
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:39:y:1984:i:4:p:983-1010

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3. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 961-972, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Elmar WOLFSTETTER, . "Auctions-An Introduction," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1994-13, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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7. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Vernon Smith's Insomnia and the Dawn of Economics as Experimental Science," Microeconomics 0212001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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   • Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2003. "Vernon Smith's Insomnia and the Dawn of Economics as Experimental Science," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 105(2), pages 181-205, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Robert Dorsey & Laura Razzolini, 2003. "Explaining Overbidding in First Price Auctions Using Controlled Lotteries," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 123-140, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Tibor Neugebauer & Reinhard Selten, 2002. "Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2003, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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