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Bidding Strategies Of Sequential First Price Auctions Programmed By Experienced Bidders Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Tibor Neugebauer (University Hannover)
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This paper considers bidding automata programmed by experienced subjects in sequential first price sealed bid auction experiments. These automata play against each other in computer tournaments. The risk neutral subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy of the independent private value model serves as a benchmark. The equilibrium strategy does not describe any of the heterogeneous automata programs submitted by subjects and does not always perform better than average in the tournament.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number
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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 25 Mar 2005Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0503007Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 32Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Keywords: Experimental Economics ; First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions ; Sequential Auctions ; Independent Private Value Model ; Finite Automata ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Hypothesis Testing C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Estimation C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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