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Bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions : Use of computerized Nash competitors

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  • Walker, James M.
  • Smith, Vernon L.
  • Cox, James C.

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  • Walker, James M. & Smith, Vernon L. & Cox, James C., 1987. "Bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions : Use of computerized Nash competitors," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 239-244.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:23:y:1987:i:3:p:239-244
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary Charness & Dan Levin, 2009. "The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 207-236, February.
    2. Dürsch, Peter & Kolb, Albert & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard, 2005. "Rage against the machines : how subjects learn to play against computers," Papers 05-36, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    3. Ronald Bosman & Arno Riedl, 2003. "Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-056/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Dürsch, Peter & Kolb, Albert & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard, 2005. "Rage against the machines : how subjects learn to play against computers," Papers 05-36, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    5. Shachat, Jason & Swarthout, J. Todd, 2012. "Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 383-402.
    6. Brosig, Jeannette & Rei[ss], J. Philipp, 2007. "Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 50-74, January.
    7. repec:wyi:journl:002151 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:cup:judgdm:v:3:y:2008:i:7:p:483-492 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Wouter van den Bos & Jian Li & Tatiana Lau & Eric Maskin & Jonathan D. Cohen & P. Read Montague & Samuel M. McClure, 2008. "The value of victory: social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 3(7), pages 483-492, October.
    10. Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2005. "Theory And Misbehavior Of First-Price Auctions: The Importance Of Information Feedback In Experimental Markets," Experimental 0503008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 2008. "Humans versus computer algorithms in repeated mixed strategy games," MPRA Paper 6672, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Maggioni, Mario A. & Rossignoli, Domenico, 2023. "If it looks like a human and speaks like a human ... Communication and cooperation in strategic Human–Robot interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    13. Tamás Csermely & Alexander Rabas, 2016. "How to reveal people’s preferences: Comparing time consistency and predictive power of multiple price list risk elicitation methods," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 107-136, December.
    14. Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2008. "Bidding ‘as if’ risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(2), pages 190-202, June.
    15. March, Christoph, 2021. "Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    16. Csermely, Tamás & Rabas, Alexander, 2014. "How to reveal people's preferences: Comparing time consistency and predictive power of multiple price list risk elicitation methods," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 185, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    17. Neugebauer, Tibor & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 183-204, January.
    18. Tibor Neugebauer, 2005. "Bidding Strategies Of Sequential First Price Auctions Programmed By Experienced Bidders," Experimental 0503007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Tamás Csermely & Alexander Rabas, 2014. "How to reveal people's preferences: Comparing time consistency and predictive power of multiple price list risk elicitation methods," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp185, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    20. Neugebauer, Tibor & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 3/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).

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