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A Technical Primer on Auction Theory I: Independent Private Values

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Steven A. Matthews

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Abstract

This primer rigorously introduces the auction model of "risk neutral bidders with independent private values". The model is central to auction theory, and its structure is the same as a many models used in information economics. Results are derived regarding the nature of equilibria, the effects of entry fess and reserve prices, revenue equilivalence, and the design of optimal auctions. Widely applicable concepts are emphasized, such as revealed preference logic, the single-crossing property, and the Revelation Principle. Intended readers are economics graduate and advanced undergraduate students, and all economists who want to examine auction theory in detail.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1096.

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Date of creation: May 1995
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1096

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  1. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2004. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Working Papers 2004-24, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Stefan Klonner, 2003. "Empirical Analysis of Rosca Auctions in a South Indian Village," Working Papers 854, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gopal Das Varma, 2000. "Standard Auctions with Identity Dependent Externalities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1145, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Ratifiability of Efficient Collusive Mechanisms in Second-Price Auctions with Participation Costs," Micro Theory Working Papers tan-04-04-30-01-35-41, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Competition Among Auctioneers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  6. Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 6476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Charles Zheng, 2000. "Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0296, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ricardo Gonçalves, 2008. "A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding," Documentos de Trabalho em Economia (Working Papers in Economics) 04, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto). [Downloadable!]
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Participation Costs," Micro Theory Working Papers tan-04-01-24-10-08-06, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Reserve prices in auctions as reference points," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse24_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2005. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-05-05-09-03-55-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  14. van den Berg, Gerard J & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2007. "If Winning Isn't Everything, Why Do They Keep Score? A Structural Empirical Analysis of Dutch Flower Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6323, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. van den Berg, Gerard J, 2005. "On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5166, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Oliver Gürtler & Christian Grund, 2006. "The Effect of Reputation on Selling Prices in Auctions," Discussion Papers 114, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Clark, Damon, 2002. "Matching, Screening and Firm Investment in General Training: Theory and Evidence," 10th International Conference on Panel Data, Berlin, July 5-6, 2002 A2-4, International Conferences on Panel Data. [Downloadable!]
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