The Ownership of the Firm under A Property Rights Approach
AbstractThe boundaries of the firm and the ownership of the firm have been two of the main themes of the economics of organization over the past several decades. In this paper, I develop a general multi-party framework that integrates the ownership of the firm into the property-rights approach to the firm. I consider the ownership of the firm as the ownership of the rights to terminate cooperation with any party while maintaining a contractual or employment relation with all the other related parties of the firm. The model in this paper allows for the separation of the ownership of the firm from the ownership of the alienable assets that partly constitute it. Such a general multi-party setup may provide new tools for the study of the problem of the firm's boundaries as well as inspiration for further applications of the theory of property rights.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2010-23.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Note: The author is grateful to Professor Richard N. Langlois as the dissertation advisor, and Professor Christian Zimmermann, Professor Vicki I. Knoblauch as the committee members for advice and suggestions, and to Professor Thomas J. Miceli, Professor Kathleen Segerson, Professor Xenia Matschke, and seminar participants at the Univ. of Connecticut for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are those of the author's alone.
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More information through EDIRC
Owner of the Firm; Boundary of the Firm; Property Rights Theory; Theory of the Firm.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- Y4 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Dissertations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-10-02 (Business Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2010-10-02 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006.
"Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
- Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- The Ownership of the Firm under a Property Rights Approach
by Dick Langlois in Organizations and Markets on 2010-10-05 19:31:19
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