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Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 25 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 17-38
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:25:y:2008:i:1:p:17-38

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Related research

Keywords: Securities laws; Regulation; Liability rule; Deterrence; Disclosure requirement; Public enforcement; K22; G18; K42;

References listed on IDEAS
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1. Burrows, Paul, 1999. "Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 227-244, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Trebilcock, Michael & Winter, Ralph A., 1997. "The economics of nuclear accident law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 215-243, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1993. "Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 239-257, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Inbae, 2007. "Endogenous selection of monetary institutions: With the case of discount windows and bureaucratic discretion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 330-350, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Rafael Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "What Works in Securities Law?," NBER Working Papers 9882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "A Reason for Quantity Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 431-435, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2004. "On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 231-235, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2004. "On the Optimal Use of Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability," IDEI Working Papers 274, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
9. Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-87, April.
13. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 410-433.

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