Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability ?
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DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105990
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2022.
"Incentives to differentiate under environmental liability laws : Product customization and precautionary effort,"
EconomiX Working Papers
2022-20, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2022. "Incentives to differentiate under environmental liability laws : Product customization and precautionary effort," Working Papers hal-04159799, HAL.
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