IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01671139.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Compensation of Third-Party Victims and Liability Sharing Rules in Oligopolistic Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Maxime Charreire

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Eric Langlais

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Accidents causing environmental damages and/or harm to several (third party) victims may result from the joint action of competing firms, in such a way that it may be too costly or impossible for Courts to disentangle the specific contribution of each firm (cf noise pollution by Orly airport 1988, Cass. 2e civ, No 86-12.543; abestos litigation in USA 1994, Becker v. Baron Bros). Courts in many jurisdictions have the opportunity in such contexts to conclude for firms liability in solidum, and to allocate the burden of damages between offenders thanks to alternative apportionment rules. In this paper, we analyze the impacts of such liability sharing arrangements (per capita vs market share rule) on output and care decisions in an oligopoly. For a symmetric oligopoly, we find that compared to the per capita rule, the market share rule leads to a lower output level but also to lower care expenditures at equilibrium. However as the net effect on the expected harm to victims is ambiguous, it is not clear that the market share rule is dominating the per capita rule. Moreover, we also show that no sharing arrangement induce the optimal levels of output and care expenditures. For an asymmetric oligopoly, we find that equilibrium market shares between low cost firms and high cost firms are more dispersed under the per capita rule than under the market share rule. This suggests the existence of strong ties between competition law and liability law, some liability regimes for joint offenders cases developing more anticompetitive effects than others. To the least, our analysis shows that the per capita rule (market share rule) provides (preserves) competitive advantages to the most (least) efficient firms. We also find that high costs firms produce more and invest more in care under the per capita rule than under the market share rule; in contrast, the comparison is undertermined for low costs firms, and thus for the industry.
(This abstract was borrowed from another v
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Maxime Charreire & Eric Langlais, 2017. "Compensation of Third-Party Victims and Liability Sharing Rules in Oligopolistic Markets," Post-Print hal-01671139, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01671139
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gérard Mondello, 2022. "Strict liability, scarce generic input and duopoly competition," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 369-404, December.
    2. Eric Langlais & Maxime Charreire, 2020. "Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability ?," EconomiX Working Papers 2020-25, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    3. Maxime Charreire & Eric Langlais, 2021. "Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability ?," Post-Print hal-03208691, HAL.
    4. Charreire, Maxime & Langlais, Eric, 2021. "Should environment be a concern for competition policy when firms face environmental liability?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    [No keyword available];

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01671139. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.