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Optimal Mechanism Design without Money

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  • Alex Gershkov
  • Benny Moldovanu
  • Xianwen Shi

Abstract

We consider the standard mechanism design environment with linear utility but without monetary transfers. We first establish an equivalence between deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes. We then use this equivalence to construct the constrained-efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-481.

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Length: Unknown pages
Date of creation: 10 Apr 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-481

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Related research

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Dominant Strategy Implementation; Median Voter Schemes; Social Choice;

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References

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  9. Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Working Papers 220, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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  21. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
  22. Alex Gershkov & Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 197-220, 01.
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Cited by:
  1. Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias, 2013. "Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 12-14.

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