Standards and Incentives in Safety Regulation
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Dissertations in Economics with number 13430.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2011
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2011-10-01 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-10-01 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2004. "On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 231-235, August.
- Bhole, Bharat & Wagner, Jeffrey, 2008. "The joint use of regulation and strict liability with multidimensional care and uncertain conviction," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 123-132, June.
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