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Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis

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  • Kellner, Christian
  • Le Quement, Mark T.
  • Riener, Gerhard

Abstract

Ambiguous language is ubiquitous and often deliberate. Recent theoretical work (Bose and Renou, 2014; Kellner and Le Quement, 2018; Beauchêne et al., 2019) has shown how language ambiguation can improve outcomes by mitigating conflict of interest. Our experiment finds a significant effect of language ambiguation on subjects who are proficient at Bayesian updating. For ambiguity averse subjects within this population, a significant part of this effect operates via the channel of subjects' desire to reduce ambiguity. For both ambiguity averse and neutral subjects within this population, an additional behavioral channel is also present.

Suggested Citation

  • Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T. & Riener, Gerhard, 2022. "Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 360-378.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:136:y:2022:i:c:p:360-378
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.007
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ambiguity aversion; Communication; Persuasion; Laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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