Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts
AbstractWhen two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 63 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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