Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge
AbstractWe consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge, between two participants in a R&D race or contest, for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licensing fee schedules, as functions of the "amount of knowledge" disclosed by the leading to the lagging agent, are considered. Conventional results, on delays in bargaining and surplus sharing in private goods environments, are sharply modified by the public good nature of innovation, and by the fundamental nonconcavity of payoffs with respect to disclosure of interim research knowledge.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 95a43.
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.
Web page: http://www.greqam.fr/
More information through EDIRC
BARGAINING; TRAINING; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; PUBLIC GOODS; GAMES;
Other versions of this item:
- Sudipto Bhattacharya & L-A Gérard-Varet & Claude d'Aspremont, 1996. "Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1996/293, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- d’ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET , Louis-André, 1996. "Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge," CORE Discussion Papers 1996012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Atallah, G., 2000.
"Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures,"
Cahiers de recherche
2000-17, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Gamal Atallah, 2003. "Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(6), pages 531-554.
- Gamal Atallah, 2002. "Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures," Working Papers 0202EClassification-JEL: , University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Gamal Atallah, 2000. "Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-53, CIRANO.
- Gamal Atallah, 2000. "Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures," Industrial Organization 0004010, EconWPA, revised 20 Mar 2002.
- ATALLAH, Gamal, 2000. "Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures," Cahiers de recherche 2000-17, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999.
"Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts,"
12533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Severinov,S., 1999. "On information sharing and incentives in R&D," Working papers 26, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.