References listed on IDEAS
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1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
2. Gandal, N. & Scotchmer, S., 1989. "Coordinating Research Through Research Joint Ventures," Papers e-89-27, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
3. Gandal, Neil & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1993. "Coordinating research through research joint ventures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 173-193, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Moore, John, 1992. "The firm as a collection of assets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 493-507, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. David De Meza & Ben Lockwood, 1998. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options And The Property Rights Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 361-386, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. repec:att:wimass:199714 is not listed on IDEAS
7. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E. M., 1992. "Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 43-69, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bhattacharya, S. & Glazer, J. & Sappington, D., 1991. "Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures," Papers 9120, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
8. Maija Halonen, 1995. "Reputation and Allocation of Ownership," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 289, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Fehr, Ernst & Kremhelmer, Susanne & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 5369, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ernst Fehr & Susanne Kremhelmer & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," IEW - Working Papers iewwp224, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr & Susanne Kremhelmer & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2004. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," Discussion Papers 11, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr & Susanne Kremhelmer & Klaus Schmidt, 2005. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Fehr, Ernst & Kremhelmer, Susanne & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," Discussion Papers in Economics 727, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr & Susanne Kremhelmer & KlausM. Schmidt, 2008. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1262-1284, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March. [Downloadable!]
5. Andras Niedermayer, 2007. "On Platforms, Incomplete Contracts, and Open Source Software," Diskussionsschriften dp0707, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
6. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/478, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Guriev, Sergei, 2004. "Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 4513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Patrick W. Schmitz, 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-, August.
8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 577-580, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)