Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge

Contents:

Author Info

  • d’ASPREMONT, Claude

    ()
    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

  • BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto

    (London School of Economics and Political Science, London)

  • GERARD-VARET , Louis-André

    (GREQAM, UMR CNRS 9900 - EHESS, Marseille)

Abstract

We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge, between two participants in a R&D race or contest, for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licensing fee schedules, as functions of the "amount of knowledge" disclosed by the leading to the lagging agent, are considered. Conventional results, on delays in bargaining and surplus sharing in private goods environments, are sharply modified by the public good nature of innovation, and by the fundamental nonconcavity of payoffs with respect to disclosure of interim research knowledge.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/download/attach/workspace/SpacesStore/2a0be914-918f-4624-a838-35a4e8cbe285/coredp_1996_12.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1996012.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Apr 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1996012

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: +32 10474304
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gamal Atallah, 2000. "Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-53, CIRANO.
  2. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," MPRA Paper 12533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Severinov,S., 1999. "On information sharing and incentives in R&D," Working papers 26, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1996012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.