Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge
AbstractWe consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge, between two participants in a R&D race or contest, for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licensing fee schedules, as functions of the "amount of knowledge" disclosed by the leading to the lagging agent, are considered. Conventional results, on delays in bargaining and surplus sharing in private goods environments, are sharply modified by the public good nature of innovation, and by the fundamental nonconcavity of payoffs with respect to disclosure of interim research knowledge.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1996012.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 1996
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- D'Aspremont, C. & Bhattacharya, S. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1995. "Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a43, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Sudipto Bhattacharya & L-A Gérard-Varet & Claude d'Aspremont, 1996. "Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 293, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999.
"Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts,"
12533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Severinov,S., 1999. "On information sharing and incentives in R&D," Working papers 26, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Atallah, G., 2000.
"Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures,"
Cahiers de recherche
2000-17, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Gamal Atallah, 2003. "Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(6), pages 531-554.
- Gamal Atallah, 2000. "Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-53, CIRANO.
- Gamal Atallah, 2000. "Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures," Industrial Organization 0004010, EconWPA, revised 20 Mar 2002.
- ATALLAH, Gamal, 2000. "Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures," Cahiers de recherche 2000-17, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Gamal Atallah, 2002. "Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures," Working Papers 0202EClassification-JEL: , University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
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