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Mandatory Food Recalls

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Author Info
Thomsen, Michael R.
Ollinger, Michael
Crandall, Philip G.
O'Bryan, Corliss
Abstract

Food recalls are important for two reasons. One is that they mitigate harm when product failures occur. Another is that they augment incentives to invest in safety. When recalls are justified for their mitigation value, it makes sense that regulatory bodies be granted more control of the recall process in order to improve the manner in which recalls are conducted. Such is the stated intent of most proposals for changing the food recall system. However, we show that recalls can be justified by their incentive effect alone. In fact, recalls can be beneficial even when the social value of the harm they mitigate is so small as to be less than the costs of carrying them out. In these cases, it is important that proposals designed to improve the recall process avoid unintended side effects. First, proposals should avoid redirecting regulatory resources towards recall oversight and away from other, more pressing, food safety priorities. Second, it is important to avoid creating an environment in which agencies face a greater need to justify their recall requests. When the mitigation value of recalls is small, this may inadvertently prevent the initiation of recalls that could otherwise play a positive role in aligning incentives for safety.

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Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida with number 6083.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea08:6083

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Related research
Keywords: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Schroeder, Ted C. & Lusk, Jayson L., 2002. "Effects of Meat Recalls on Futures Market Prices," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 31(1), April. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Marino, Anthony M, 1997. "A Model of Product Recalls with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 245-65, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomsen, Michael R & McKenzie, Andrew M, 2001. " Market Incentives for Safe Foods: An Examination of Shareholder Losses from Meat and Poultry Recalls," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 83(3), pages 526-38, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Frenzen, Paul D. & Buzby, Jean C. & Rasco, Barbara, 2001. "Product Liability And Microbial Foodborne Illness," Agricultural Economics Reports 34059, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dranove, David & Olsen, Chris, 1994. "The Economic Side Effects of Dangerous Drug Announcements," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 323-48, October.
  7. Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jarrell, Gregg & Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 512-36, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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