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An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries

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Author Info

  • Ingo Vogelsang

    ()

  • Nishal Ramphal

    ()

  • Stephen Carroll

    ()

  • Nicholas Pace

    ()

Abstract

Regulation and consumer class actions can complement, duplicate, or oppose each other, depending, among others, on the leanings of regulatory objective functions towards the industry or consumers. In particular, pro-consumer regulators would like to see consumers benefit from class actions while pro-industry regulators would like to prevent regulated firms from being harmed by them. However, because pro-consumer regulators are already doing their best for consumers and pro-industry regulators their best for firms, they are both usually constrained in their policies. The result is that class actions tend to be less efficient under pro-consumer regulators and more efficient under pro-industry regulators. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 87-104

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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:32:y:2007:i:1:p:87-104

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298

Related research

Keywords: Class action; Insurance regulation; Price regulation; Legal costs; Compensation; K13; K23; K41; L51;

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References

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  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Thomas W. Ross, 1984. "Uncovering Regulators' Social Welfare Weights," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 152-155, Spring.
  3. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-40, August.
  4. Aino Halinen, 1999. "From Dyadic Change to Changing Business Networks: An Analytical Framework," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(6), pages 779-794, November.
  5. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 575-612, June.
  6. Gupta, Atul & LeCompte, Richard L. B. & Misra, Lalatendu, 1997. "Acquisitions of solvent thrifts: Wealth effects and managerial motivations," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1431-1450, October.
  7. Alon Klement, 2004. "Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 102-124, April.
  8. Che, Yeon-Koo, 1996. "Equilibrium formation of class action suits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 339-361, November.
  9. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
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