IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jieclw/v23y2020i1p1-23..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Trumping Capacity Gap with Negotiation Strategies: the Mexican USMCA Negotiation Experience

Author

Listed:
  • Amrita Bahri
  • Monica Lugo

Abstract

In the past few months, we have witnessed the ‘worst deal’ in the history of the USA become the ‘best deal’ in the history of the USA. The negotiation leading to the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) appeared as an ‘asymmetrical exchange’ scenario that could have led to an unbalanced outcome for Mexico. However, Mexico stood firm on its positions and negotiated a modernized version of North American Free Trade Agreement. Mexico faced various challenges during this renegotiation, not only because it was required to negotiate with two developed countries but also due to the high level of ambition and demands raised by the new US administration. This paper provides an account of these impediments. More importantly, it analyzes the strategies that Mexico used to overcome the resource constraints it faced amidst the unpredictable political dilemma in the US and at home. In this manner, this paper seeks to provide a blueprint of strategies that other developing countries could employ to overcome their negotiation capacity constraints, especially when they are dealing with developed countries and in uncertain political environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Amrita Bahri & Monica Lugo, 2020. "Trumping Capacity Gap with Negotiation Strategies: the Mexican USMCA Negotiation Experience," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-23.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:23:y:2020:i:1:p:1-23.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jiel/jgz029
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wichardt, Philipp C. & Schunk, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 33-35, April.
    2. Bahri, Amrita, 2016. "Handling WTO disputes with the private sector: the triumphant Brazilian experience," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68276, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Makkai, Toni & Braithwaite, John, 1992. "In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 61-78, January.
    4. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 2015. "Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 579-607.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Per J. Agrell & Axel Gautier, 2017. "A Theory of Soft Capture," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(3), pages 571-596, July.
    2. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    3. Lucija Muehlenbachs & Stefan Staubli & Mark A. Cohen, 2016. "The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 159-204.
    4. David Coen, 2005. "Managing the Political Life Cycle of Regulation in the UK and German Telecommunication Sectors," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(1), pages 59-84, March.
    5. Russell W. Mills & Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, 2014. "Secondary learning and the unintended benefits of collaborative mechanisms: The Federal Aviation Administration's voluntary disclosure programs," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(4), pages 437-454, December.
    6. Justin Rex, 2020. "Anatomy of agency capture: An organizational typology for diagnosing and remedying capture," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(2), pages 271-294, April.
    7. Massaro, Maria, 2019. "Is business lobbying in the European Union context-dependent? Evidence from the policy field of radio spectrum," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(10).
    8. Smith, Vernon L. & Wilson, Bart J., 2018. "Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 452-464.
    9. Alketa Peci & Aline de Menezes Santos & Bruno César Pino Oliveira de Araújo, 2022. "Quo Vadis? Career paths of Brazilian regulators," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(2), pages 470-486, April.
    10. Seung‐Hun Hong & Jong‐sung You, 2018. "Limits of regulatory responsiveness: Democratic credentials of responsive regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 413-427, September.
    11. Victoria Pistikou, 2020. "The Impact of CEFTA on Exports, Economic Growth and Development," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), International Hellenic University (IHU), Kavala Campus, Greece (formerly Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology - EMaTTech), vol. 13(3), pages 15-31, December.
    12. Elmar Lukas & Andreas Welling, 2011. "The Impact of Managerial Flexibility on Negotiation Strategy and Bargaining Power," FEMM Working Papers 110008, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    13. Andrzej Sławiński, 2013. "Institutional Causes of the Global Banking Crisis and the Emergence of Macro-Prudential Countercyclical Policy," FindEcon Chapters: Forecasting Financial Markets and Economic Decision-Making, in: Władysław Milo & Piotr Wdowiński (ed.), Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica nr 295/2013 - Financial Markets and Macroprudential Policy, edition 1, volume 127, chapter 1, pages 7-24, University of Lodz.
    14. Adam William Chalmers & Robyn Klingler‐Vidra & Alfio Puglisi & Lisa Remke, 2022. "In and out of revolving doors in European Union financial regulatory authorities," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1233-1249, October.
    15. Jeroen van der Heijden, 2017. "Brighter and Darker Sides of Intermediation," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 670(1), pages 207-224, March.
    16. Per J. Agrell & Axel Gautier, 2012. "Rethinking Regulatory Capture," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Sounman Hong & Jeehun Lim, 2016. "Capture and the bureaucratic mafia: does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 69-86, January.
    18. Michelle Pautz & Sara Rinfret, 2011. "Making sense of the front lines: environmental regulators in Ohio and Wisconsin," Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, Springer;Association of Environmental Studies and Sciences, vol. 1(4), pages 277-288, December.
    19. Helle Ørsted Nielsen & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, 2023. "Different encounter behaviors: Businesses in encounters with regulatory agencies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 61-82, January.
    20. Matteo Fiorini & Bernard Hoekman, 2017. "Economic Governance, Regulation and Services Trade Liberalization," RSCAS Working Papers 2017/27, European University Institute.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:23:y:2020:i:1:p:1-23.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jiel .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.