The Impact of Managerial Flexibility on Negotiation Strategy and Bargaining Power
AbstractUsing a dynamic real options approach we show that in a sequential bargaining framework managerial flexibility is strengthening the first-mover advantage by undermining the bargaining power of the second mover. Furthermore we compare the results of the sequential framework with the results of cooperative bargaining.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 110008.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
real option; game theory; sale; negotiation; flexibility; ultimatum game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-04-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CSE-2011-04-23 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-GTH-2011-04-23 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wichardt, Philipp C. & Schunk, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009.
"Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining,"
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 33-35, April.
- Philipp C. Wichardt & Daniel Schunk & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2008. "Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining," IEW - Working Papers 398, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
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- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July.
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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