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Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

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  • Ehlers, Lars
  • Majumdar, Dipjyoti
  • Mishra, Debasis
  • Sen, Arunava

Abstract

In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ehlers, Lars & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava, 2020. "Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 31-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:88:y:2020:i:c:p:31-41
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004
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    3. Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "On the implementation of the median," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).

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