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Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees

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  • d’ASPREMONT, C.
  • PELEG, B.

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  • d’ASPREMONT, C. & PELEG, B., 1986. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1986042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1986042
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    Cited by:

    1. Kushnir, Alexey, 2013. "Harmful signaling in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 209-218.
    2. Madhuparna Karmokar & Souvik Roy, 2023. "The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(1), pages 111-152, July.
    3. Karmokar, Madhuparna & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules," MPRA Paper 103494, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," Working Papers 147, Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Mishra, Debasis, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 925-954.
    6. Alexey I. Kushnir, 2010. "Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000351, David K. Levine.
    7. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings," Working Papers 05001, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
    8. Ayse Yazici, 2022. "Decentralized Matching at Senior-Level: Stability and Incentives," Working Papers 2022_01, Durham University Business School.
    9. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Papers 2009.13104, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    10. Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Roy, Souvik, 2021. "Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 11-27.
    11. Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April.
    12. Lars EHLERS & Jordi MASSO, 2018. "Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets : A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 04-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    13. Pais, Joana, 2008. "Incentives in decentralized random matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.
    14. Arunava Sen, 2002. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Voting Schemes joint with Dipjyoti Majumdar," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000090, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2021. "Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 63-95, July.
    16. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible voting schemes," Discussion Papers 03-01, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    17. Yazıcı, Ayşe, 2022. "Decentralized matching at senior-level: Stability and incentives," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    18. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 651-664, December.
    19. Ehlers, Lars & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava, 2020. "Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 31-41.

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