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Incentives in decentralized random matching markets

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Pais, Joana

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Abstract

Decentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of preferences. Moreover, every such equilibrium preserves stability for a particular profile of preferences. In particular, when firms best reply by acting truthfully, every equilibrium outcome is stable for the true preferences. Conversely, when the initial matching is the empty matching, every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the game.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 64 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 632-649
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:632-649

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Related research
Keywords: Matching markets Stability Random mechanisms;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings," Working Papers 05001, Concordia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1342-1352, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 523-540, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Joana Pais, 2006. "On Random Matching Markets: Properties and Equilibria," Working Papers 2006/11, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
  6. Guillaume Haeringer & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Decentralised Job Matching," Working Papers 2003.114, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching," Working Papers hal-00242988_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  9. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1991. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 31-44, January.
  10. Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi, 2007. "Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 587-600, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joana Pais, 2006. "On Random Matching Markets: Properties and Equilibria," Working Papers 2006/11, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
  2. Joana Pais, 2008. "Random matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 99-116, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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